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"C" IS FOR CONSTITUTION: RECOGNIZING THE DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS OF CHILDREN IN CONTESTED
ADOPTIONS
Melissa LaBarge*
In contested adoptions, those unfortunate situations in
which biological parents and adoptive parents fight for cus-
tody of a child, all too often the child's interests are not con-
sidered when determining with whom she' will ultimately re-
side. In the tug-of-war for custody, the courts' references to
the rights of biological and adoptive parents seem to liken the
child to a piece of property.2 In far too many cases, the
courts make their decisions without regard to the severe psy-
chological and developmental harm that will result to the
child from removing her from the only home she has ever
known and sending her to live with virtual strangers.3 As one
expert has noted, "[wihenever there's a clash between rights,
somebody's needs get trampled- usually the children's.";r
A recognition of the constitutional rights of children, as
individuals, to a due process hearing on their best interests,
accompanied by statutory reform in adoption laws, would ob-
viate custody decisions that treat children as chattels and
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valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article; Sacha Coupet and Robert
LaBarge, Jr. for their suggestions on a subsequent draft; and the staff of the Journal
of Constitutional Law for their assistance with the editing and publishing process.
The author would also like to thank her family for supporting her decision to attend
law school.
For clarity, "she" is used in this Comment to refer to children of both genders.
2 See Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children
to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REv. 358, 381
(1994) ("[These decisions reduce the child to an object instead of treating the child
as a person. The child becomes a nonentity and is not accorded any rights, consid-
eration, or value." (internal citations omitted)).
3 See Marcus T. Boccaccini & Eleanor Willemsen, Contested Adoption and tile
Liberty Interest of the Child, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 211, 219-20 (1998) ("If a child is
removed from the only secure home she has known, she Is at risk for difficulties In
human interaction and relationships, underachievement, and failure to successfully
parent the next generation.").
4 Dianne Hales, What About the Best Interests of the Child?, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Jan. 22, 1994, at 20 (quoting Dr. Dennis Donovan, Medical Director of the
Children's Center for Developmental Psychiatry in St. Petersburg, Fla.) (discussing
contested adoptions).
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subject them to undue suffering merely because one person
has established a superior "right" to custody of the child. In-
deed, in making a custody decision, "[w]ho has more inter-
est... than the child?"5 Unfortunately, however, the child's
interests and rights are usually subordinated to those
claimed by the adults involved in the dispute.6
I. CURRENr ADOPTION LAWS AND STANDARDS
A. Biological-Parental Fitness Standard and the
"Best Interests of the Child" Standard
In contested adoption cases, courts normally use one of
the following standards in deciding whether a prospective
adoptive parent should retain custody: a biological-parental
fitness standard' or a "best interests of the child" standard.8
Under the biological-parental fitness standard, the standard
used in the majority of states,9 courts must return the child
to the custody of the biological parent absent a showing of
unfitness or a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights."
This is done upon the biological parent's demand without
consideration of whether this will cause severe harm to the
child." With the "best interests" standard, the needs and in-
terests of the child are considered paramount in determining
whether to award custody to the adoptive parents or biologi-
cal parent.
12
5 Joel D. Tenenbaum. Everyone's Constitution. DEL LAWYER. Summer 1994. at 4.
4-6 (arguing that children should be entitled to independent counsel In child custody
and termination of parental rights proceedings).
6 See, e.g., Virginia Mixon Swindell. Comment. Children's Partlicpation in Custo-
dial and Parental Right Determinations, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 659. 661 (1994) (A child's
needs, interests, and rights have become subordinated to the conflicting desires of
various adults claiming some interest in the child.).
See In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324. 334 (Ill. 1995) (stating that the biological
parental fitness standard is the "law of the land").
8 See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies. Bonding, and Burning Build-
ings: Discerning Parenthood in Irrational Action. 81 VA. L. REV. 2493. 2504-05 (1995)
(criticizing the "best interest" standard for its "adult-centric" rather than "child-
centered" perspective); Cynthia Morton, Case Note. Children Are Not A Prize To Be
Battled Over in Custody Disputes Between Adoptive Parents and Biological Parents:
Baby Richard's Case, 23 W. Sr. U. L. REV. 243, 246-47 (1995) (describing the best
interests of the child standard and its historical development).9 See Woodhouse, supra note 8, at 2510-11.
10 See id.
" See id. at 2511 (criticizing the standard for its harmful effects on the children in
question).
12 See, e.g., Melanie B. Lewis. Case Note, Inappropriate Application of the Best In-
terests of the Child Standard Leads to Worst Case Scenario: In re C.C.R.S.. 68 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 259, 262-64 (1997) (describing the standards applied In custody dis-
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B. Problems With the Current Standards
The danger with using the biological-parental fitness stan-
dard is that courts do not take into consideration the serious
harm that will result from removing a child from the custody
of a person with whom she has an "attachment." 3 "Attach-
ment" is a term used by psychologists to explain the impor-
tant connection between babies who are psychologically well-
cared for and their caregivers. 4 Attachment, which develops
over the course of the first year of life, is crucial to an infant's
and child's normal development.' 5 It enables the child to
connect with others and provides the "secure base" from
which the child can develop independence and learn on her
own. 
16
Research shows that insecurely attached babies have less
advanced communication skills and less advanced motor and
cognitive development in certain areas than securely attached
babies.17  On the other hand, secure attachment leads to
"more complex and better language skills and higher levels of
intellectual development."' 8
Attached children "become very disturbed if they are sepa-
rated from their primary caregivers and do not readily accept
substitute caregivers.19 This separation can lead to "conduct
disorders and antisocial development."0 Even a psychologist
testifying on behalf of a biological father in a contested adop-
tion case conceded that removing the two-and-a-half-year-old
child from the custody of his adoptive parents would be a
putes).
13 See Boccaccini & Willemsen, supra note 3, at 217 (arguing that "[the] current
trend of viewing the child's interests as largely dependent upon the biological father's
parental fitness is not only inadequate, but can inadvertently result in irreparable
harm to the child").
14 See id. (citing William H. Berman & Michael B. Sperling, The Structure and
uiction of Adult Attachment, in ATrACHMENT IN ADULTS 5, 5 (1994)).
15 See id.
16 See id. at 217-18 (citing Adriana G. Bus & Marunus H. Van lJzendoom, At-
tachment and Early Reading: A Longitudinal Study, 149 J. GENEIC PSYCHOL. 199,
199-200 (1989)).
17 See id. (citing ATTACHMENT IN THE PRESCHOOL YEARS: THEORY, RESEARCH. AND
INTERVENTION 200-01 (Mark I. Greenberg et al. eds., 1990)).
18 Id. (citing JEREMY HOLMS, JOHN BOWLBY AND ATrACHMENT THEORY 111 (1993)).
19 Paige Kerchner Kaplan, Comment, Putting the Child First in Custody Battles Be-
tween Biological Fathers and Adoptive Parents, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 907, 933
(1995).
20 Id. at 935 (describing expert testimony in a child custody hearing regarding the
consequences of separating an attached child from his guardian) (citing In re Michael
H., No. A37092, slip op. at 7 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County, Juv. Div., 1993)).
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"'nightmare'" for him.2' Research has proven that a child's
early experience of attachment has a "powerful life-long influ-
ence" on the child.'
In addition to ignoring the dangers of removing children
who have developed healthy attachments to their primary
caregivers, courts using the biological-parental fitness stan-
dard often do not consider past violent or neglectful behavior
of the biological parents when making their custody determi-
nation.' With the presumption of fitness of the biological
parent and his or her concomitant right to custody, this be-
havior, absent truly egregious conduct, often does not enter
into the custody determination. 24 As one judge has explained,
the biological-parental fitness standard:
has acquired rigidity from the dubious and amorphous principle
that the natural parent has some sort of constitutional 'right: to
the custody of his child. This principle comes dangerously close
to treating the child in some sense as the property of his parent,
an unhappy analog which the Supreme Court has been guilty of
in another contexL
On the other hand, the "best interests of the child" stan-
dard, while rejecting a property-like analysis in determining
custody, is also problematic. One of the major criticisms is
that "best interests" is a vague standard, often defined from
an adult perspective that focuses on the socioeconomic status
of the parties involved.26 Critics of this standard are con-
cerned that under a "best interests" determination, judges
may let their prejudices regarding, for example, class, race, or
sexual orientation, guide their decision, rather than a real
"best interests" analysis.27 Such critics argue that social en-
21 Id.
22 Boccaccini & Willemsen, supra note 3, at 217.
See Woodhouse, supra note 8. at 2515 n.62 (describing cases in which one
biological father seeking custody was convicted and served time for sexual assault.
another had failed to financially support or even visit two prior children he had fa-
thered, and yet another was accused of physical abuse by the biological mother of
the child).
24 See id. (describing cases in which biological parents won custody of their chil-
dren despite past evidence of unfitness).
25 In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649. 670 (MIch. 1993) (L&vln. J.. dissent-
ing) (arguing that the majority's decision to uphold Iowa's ruling granting custody of
a child to her biological parents would only be proper if the dispute concerned a
"carload of hay.").
See Woodhouse, supra note 8. at 2504-05 (comparing a child-centered per-
spective to an adult-centric one).
Melanie Togman Sloan, No Afore Baby Jesstcas: Proposed Revisions to the Pa-
rental Kidnapping Prevention Act. 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 355. 378 (1994) (com-
menting that "OJudges can disguise decisions based on improper factors by vague
recitations of general language, and as a result, the real reasons underlying a cus-
tody award may be very different from the stated ones.").
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gineering is inherent in this standard and allege that courts
using this determination tend to award custody to adoptive
parents because they are usually in a higher social class than
the birth parents and can provide more to the child in terms
of material goods.'
C. Child-Centered Standard
While the above arguments are not without merit, a "best
interests" standard that truly considers a child's needs and
interests defines such interests from the child's perspective.
In the same way that children do not use blood ties in order
to determine whom to love, they do not define their attach-
ments in terms of material goods. 0 For young children, their
"parent" could be any person who fulfills their needs and with
whom the child has formed an emotional attachment.3 ' From
the child's perspective, parenthood is "based on continuous
day-to-day interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutu-
ality."32  For these reasons, courts using a "best interests"
standard should take into account:
an assessment of the child's age, the extent of bonding with the
prospective adoptive parent or parents, the extent of bonding or
the potential to bond with the birth parent or parents, and the
ability of the birth parent or parents to provide adequate and
proper care and guidance to the child.33
A child-centered "best interests" standard is the only way
to ensure that the child's rights are being protected. 34 This
standard can only be mandated through constitutional rec-
ognition of a child's due process right to a hearing on her best
See Toni L. Craig, Comment, Establishing the Biological Rights Doctrine to Pro-
tect Unwed Fathers in Contested Adoptions, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391. 405-06 (1998)
(arguing that "the biological rights doctrine serves... state social, economic, and
administrative interests").
29 See Woodhouse, supra note 8. at 2504-05 (arguing for a child-centered per-
spective in custody cases); see also Sloan, supra note 27, at 364-74 (explaining the
standard and discussing its application by various courts in different custody cases).
30 See Boccaccini & Willemsen, spra note 3, at 217 (explaining that children form
attachment bonds with those whom they recognize as attendant to their wants and
needs).
31 See Sloan, supra note 27, at 376 (describing how children view their relation-
shi~s with their caregivers).
Id. (suggesting that "Itlhe law needs to recognize that after significant time has
passed, whatever the cause and whoever may be responsible, the child does not rec-
ognize biological parents as his or her psychological parents.").
33 Kaplan, supra note 19, at 940 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 8815(d) (West 1995)).
34 See Woodhouse, supra note 8, at 2504-05 (arguing that unlike the parent-
centered "best interest" standard, "a child-centered perspective values relationships
of attachment, because they are so important to children").
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interests. In contested adoption cases, recognition of chil-
dren as individuals deserving of constitutional protection
would alleviate the problems of inconsistent adoption laws
among the states and property-like analyses in custody de-
terminations.35
The basic rights of a child to a secure upbringing and
emotional well-being should not depend upon the state in
which the child or her parents happen to reside, nor should it
depend upon vague or arbitrary factors. Our legal system
needs to acknowledge that although adoptive and biological
parents, and even the states, may have certain rights in con-
tested adoption cases, these rights do not take precedence
over the constitutional rights of the child.m
I. CHILDREN AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Framers' Intent
The United States Constitution does not contain any spe-
cific reference to children, parents, or families! a Nothing
about children or parents appears in the records or debates
leading to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.s
Constitutional scholars have advanced various reasons for
the omission of any specific mention of children. For in-
stance, perhaps it never occurred to the Framers that chil-
dren needed separate constitutional status from adults, i.e.,
that children's interests were sufficiently protected by their
parents; or possibly, the Framers may have believed it was
within the province of the states to regulate the parent-child
relationship.' Others, however, have expressed more cyni-
cism, suggesting that the Framers did not even consider chil-
dren's rights and noting that the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals was founded before a similar society was
founded to protect children.
is See Homer H. Clark, Jr., Children and the Constitution. 1992 U. ILL L REv. 1.
19-29 (1992) (arguing that inconsistencies In adoption decisions may be alleviated by
greater focus on the constitutional rights of the child).
36 See id. at 5-6 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault. 387 U.S.
1 (1967), which recognized that children have basic rights under the Due Process
Clause and the Bill of Rights).
37 See generally U.S. CONST.
38 See Clark, supra note 35. at 1 (noting that children or parents are not men-
tioned in the Constitution).
39 See icl. at 2 (discussing theories about why the Constitution does not specifl-
caillV apply to children).
See Tenenbaum, supra note 5. at 4 (advocating equal constitutional rights for
children).
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B. The Fourteenth Amendment
Nevertheless, while the Constitution does not explicitly
mention children or family rights, the history behind the
adoption of the Civil War Amendments4 shows that "the pas-
sage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments [] made family freedom a constitutional right."4 2 These
amendments, passed to abolish slavery and to guarantee
freedom to all persons regardless of race or color, demon-
strate that the drafters and advocates of the Fourteenth
Amendment "understood rights of family as aspects of liberty,
fundamental to proper definitions of freedom and citizenship
and necessary to the govemmental structure envisioned for a
reconstructed Union.
Before the passage of the Civil War amendments, slaves
suffered an almost complete denial of family rights: they
could not legally marry, had little voice in the upbringing of
their children, and were often physically separated from their
families through the sale of a family member or the appren-
ticeships of their children to other slaveholders. 4 From the
moment of birth, the child of a slave was legally considered
the property of the slaveowner and therefore completely sub-
ject to the slaveowner's will.
45
Abolitionists believed that the Constitution should not
only prohibit slavery, but also protect the basic aspects of
freedom: the fundamental rights to marry and raise chil-
dren.46 Members of the Reconstruction Congress "repeatedly
acknowledged the fundamental and inalienable character of
41 See U.S. CONSF. amend. XIII (abolishing slavery); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,
stating that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XV (guaranteeing the right to vote regardless of "race, color.
or previous condition of servitude").
PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES
4 (1997) (positing that knowledge of the stories of enslaved families inspired a com-
mitment to family rights).
43 Id. at 9 (arguing that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes the
"constitutional legitimacy of family rights doctrine").
44 See id. at 30-35, 90-102 (recounting personal narratives of people whose fami-
lies had been torn apart by slavery).
45 See id. at 91 (discussing the subordinating effects of the denial of family rights).
46 See ki. at 111 (arguing that the rights to marry and to become parents are fun-
damental prerequisites to a free society).
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rights of family,"47 and supporters of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment regarded it as "an instrument to reenshrine family
rights as inalienable aspects of national citizenship and natu-
ral law." 4
C. Development of Constitutional Rights for Parents
and Children
While some scholars believe that the Supreme Court's de-
cisions do not "teach as well as [they] might why the Consti-
tution, read in the context of the forces that produced it,
protects the right of families to function with a significant
measure of autonomy,"49 the Supreme Court has accorded
constitutional protections to parents and the family unit
through the Fourteenth Amendment.0 However, the Court
has also held that parents' rights are not absolute: the State,
acting as parens patriae, may restrict parental authority "in
things affecting the child's welfare."1
The Supreme Court has also recognized that children are
"persons" under the Constitution and that they possess "fun-
damental rights which the State must respect." Indeed, as
the Court eplained in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth "[clonstitutional rights do not mature and come
into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by
the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." How-
ever, while acknowledging that children do have constitu-
tional rights, the Court has also ruled that "the constitutional
47 Id. at 113 (recounting the debates in the U.S. Senate over the Thirteenth
Amendment).
4 Id. at 10 (describing the attitudes of the Reconstruction Congress and aboli-
tionists).
49 Id. at 6 (arguing that "[t]he [Supreme] Court's story of family liberty has thus far
been written from a perspective that obscures Important evidence-).
50 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510. 535 (1925) (holding that parents
have a constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of their children):
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390. 399-400 (1923) (holding that the liberty interest
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to 'bring up" and edu-
cate one's children).
51 Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S. 158. 166-67 (1944) (upholding. over guard-
ian's objection, a state statute prohibiting children from selling magazines on the
street).
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. DIsL. 393 U.S. 503. 511 (1969)
(holding that suspensions of students for wearing black armbands was a violation of
the students' constitutional rights under the First Amendment).
" 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
54 Id. at 74 (invalidating as unconstitutional a blanket state provision requiring
parental consent before an unmarried minor could obtain an abortion).
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rights of children cannot be equated with those of
adults . . .55
This does not mean that children's rights are lesser than
those of adults in the context of contested adoption. It simply
means that due to "the peculiar vulnerability of children;
their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, ma-
ture manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing,"6 the State may have the right to involve itself in ar-
eas, such as child labor and mandatory schooling, in which it
could not get involved to the same extent with adults. It is
precisely for the aforementioned reasons that children need
special protection, not a refusal of protection."
One must also question the notion that recognizing the
constitutional rights of parents will protect those of children.'
"[The protective nature of the family should not insulate the
child from receiving the guarantees of the Constitution."9
This is especially true since "in contemporary society the in-
terests of parents and children sometimes do not coincide
and in fact often conflict."6° Contested adoption cases are
clear proof of this conflict."
D. The Supreme Court and the Family
Certain Supreme Court holdings in family cases support a
rejection of the strict biological-parental fitness doctrine as
potentially violative of a child's constitutional rights. In Lehr
v. Robertson,2 the Court upheld a stepparent adoption of an
out-of-wedlock child over the objection of the child's biological
father.6 The Court ruled that "the mere existence of a bio-
55 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (holding that a state statute requir-
ing a pregnant minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of her parents or to
obtain judicial approval following parental notification was unconstitutional).
Id at 634 (explaining why children's constitutional rights are not equal to those
of adults).
57 See Vanessa L. Warzynski, Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: The "Psy-
chological Parent" Standard, 39 VILL. L. REv. 737, 747 (1994) (arguing that the
heightened interest of the state with regards to children warrants greater protection
of children's constitutional rights).
See Clark, supra note 35, at 40 (arguing that adults and children need different
protections from the law).
59 Holmes, supra note 2, at 387 (arguing that children are entitled to constitution-
ally-guaranteed rights despite the roles and wishes of their parents).
Clark, supra note 35, at 40 (discussing intra- and inter-family conflicts over
children's best interests).
61 See id.
62 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Id. (holding that a biological father's Fourteenth Amendment rights were not
violated where the biological mother's new husband adopted the biological father's
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logical link"6 does not entitle a natural father to the same
constitutional protection regarding his child as a father who
"demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of
his child."' The Court also held that "[plarental rights do not
spring full-blown from the biological connection between par-
ent and child. They require relationships more enduring.
Lehr is a clear articulation that a mere biological connec-
tion between a parent and child is not dispositive regarding
custody of the child. The Court recognized that biological
parentage is not equivalent to or indicative of the best inter-
ests of the child. This holding acknowledged that "the
state's interest in establishing workable adoption procedures
was based on the needs of children... for secure adoption
placements."m Supreme Court precedents do indicate that
parents have certain rights regarding their children,m but
their rights are not absolute,7 and, as Lehr has shown,
"[blind adherence to a policy favoring the biological definition
of family is more often than not contrary to the best interests
of the children."7
In a case similar to Lehr, the Court in Quilloin v. WalcottO
sustained the adoption of a child by his stepparent over the
objection of the natural father.? The Court framed the issue
as whether the biological father's interests "were adequately
protected by a 'best interests of the child' standard" and held
in the affirmative.74 The biological father did not abandon his
child, nor was he found to be unfit.h However, the Court up-
held the adoption because it gave "full recognition to a family
child over the biological father's objections).
64 Id- at 261.
Id. at 256 (quotation marks and emendation omitted).
Id. at 260 (emphasis in original omitted) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed. 441
U.S. 380. 397 (1979) (Stewart. J., dissenting)).
See id. at 262 (noting that if a biological father fails to take responsibility for his
child "the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a state to listen to his
opinion of where the child's best interests lie").
Clark, supra note 35, at 22.
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510. 534-35 (1925) (rejecting state
statute requiring parents to send their children to public schools): Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (overturning a statute proscribing the teaching of
foreign languages to children).
70 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158. 166 (1944) (noting that the -rights
of parenthood are [not] beyond limitation").
Tenenbaum, supra note 5. at 6.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
3 Id.
74 See id. at 254.
7 See id. at 247.
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unit already in existence," and because it was "a result de-
sired by all concerned, except [the biological father]." 6
Lehr and Quilloin demonstrate that the Constitution does
not accord protection to a mere biological link but to an exis-
tent family. ' As the Court explained, albeit in dicta, in Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families:78 "[b]iological relationships
are not exclusive determination of the existence of a family
7
0
and that "the importance of the familial relationship...
stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the
intimacy of daily association."8°
E. Recognizing Children's Individual Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether a child
who has been in long-term custody with non-biological "par-
ents" and has formed an attachment to them acquires a right
to a custody hearing that addresses her interests and welfare
separate from her biological parents' rights. " However, the
Court has held that the Constitution applies to children,"
and previous Court decisions regarding children's due proc-
ess rights seem to indicate that the child does have protected
constitutional rights in the situation of contested adoption.
In Goss v. Lopez,' the Supreme Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that, before
suspending a student for ten days or less, a high school must
give the student notice of the charges against her and an 0
portunity to respond to them.84 In the case of In re GaulF,
7 Id. at 255.
7 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258 (1983) ("[The Court has found that
the relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest In liberty
entitled to constitutional protection.").
78 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
9 Id. at 843 (holding that procedures implemented by the state and city of New
York for removing children from foster care were constitutional).
8 Id. at 844.
81 See Woodhouse, supra note 8. at 2513 (arguing that when the Court addresses
these issues, "it will go far toward answering the question of whether our constitu-
tionalized conception of parents' rights Is instrumental... or a throwback to princi-
ples of patriarchal ownership").
82 See e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979) ("A child... is not beyond
the protection of the Constitution."); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Minors... are protected by the Constitution."): Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that
students do not "shed their constitutional rights.., at the schoolhouse gate").
8 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
Id at 576 ("A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis in our view and
may not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process Clause.").
85 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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the Court held that compliance with the due process guar-
antees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments means
that, in juvenile delinquency proceedings, minors have a con-
stitutional right to notice, to counsel, and to confront wit-
nesses against them.8I Minors also enjoy the protections of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.s
These cases and others regarding children69 lead to the con-
clusion that the Due Process Clause and the Bill of Rights
apply to children.9 In fact, the Gault Court affirmatively
stated that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill
of Rights is for adults alone."9'
If minors have due process rights in juvenile delinquency
proceedings, it follows that children have due process rights
in other proceedings that threaten their liberty, including
contested adoptions. As Justice Fortas observed in In re
Gaulk "Due process of law is the primary and indispensable
foundation of individual freedom." Individual freedom, as
the American slavery experience has proven, encompasses
personal liberty (i.e., freedom from bondage) and rights of
family autonomy for both adults and children, such as the
right to marry and the right to be raised in a home without
the threat of removal without due process of law.'
Indeed, Justice Fortas's quote in In re Gault regarding the
meaning of due process and the applicability of the Constitu-
tion to children can be read as not limited to the context of
delinquency proceedings:
In their zeal to care for children neither juvenile judges nor wel-
fare workers can be permitted to violate the Constitution, espe-
See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("Nor [shall any person) be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.").
8 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-57 (holding that the manner of a delinquency pro-
ceeding in which a fifteen-year-old boy was committed to state industrial school was
a violation of the boy's constitutional rights).
See f&. at 47 (noting that the privilege against self-incrimination Is a safeguard
that assures that admissions or confessions are voluntary).
89 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl. 431 U.S. 678. 693 (1977) (holding
that minors have a right of privacy concerning decisions regarding procreation): Dan-
forth. 428 U.S. at 74 (overturning blanket parental notification requirement for mi-
nors seeking abortions); In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358. 368 (1970) (holding that in Ju-
venile delinquency proceedings, due process requires proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (holding that minors have First Amend-
ment free speech rights).
so See Clark, supranote 35, at 5-6 (discussing the Court's decision In Gault).
91 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13.
92 See id. at 20.
93 DAVIS, supra note 42, at 247 ("Freedom meant the right to form a legally recog-
nized family within which one might develop a 'family theology'... [andi supervise
the socialization, learning, and value formation of one's children.').
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cially the constitutional provisions as to due process that are In-
volved in moving a child from its home. The indispensable ele-
ments of due process are: first, a tribunal with jurisdiction; sec-
ond, notice of a hearing to the proper parties; and finally, a fair
hearing. All three must be present if we are to treat the child as
an individual human being and not to revert, in spite of good in-
tentions, to the more primitive days when he was treated as a
chattel.94
Permanently removing a child from her home without a
hearing that addresses her interests in the context of con-
tested adoption is treating her as a chattel and can be just as
violative of her right to individual freedom and just as psy-
chologically detrimental as being committed to a juvenile de-
tention facility.95 In fact, it is plausible to argue that it is an
even greater violation. Gerald Gault was facing a six-year
removal from his home. In contested adoption cases, chil-
dren face permanent removal from their homes and perma-
nent severance of their established family ties.
In addition, if a child has due process rights in school,
certainly she must have due process rights outside of that
setting because the stakes are so much greater. A child's lib-
erty interest in not being removed from her home environ-
ment without due process must be stronger than her liberty
interest in not being barred from school for a period of up to
two weeks without a proper hearing.
The Fourteenth Amendment must be recognized as pro-
tecting children's liberty from state-imposed physical, psy-
chological and developmental harm in all contexts.9 Indeed,
in its decisions regarding students' rights in schools97 and in
juvenile delinquency proceedings,98 the Court accorded chil-
In re Gault 387 U.S. at 19 n.25 (quoting ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, VIRTUE: BASIC
STRUCTURE FOR CHILDREN'S SERVICES IN MICHIGAN, Foreword p. x (1953)).
95 See Holmes, supra note 2, at 387 ("Extending the children's constitutional
rights to the familial setting, as in other institutional settings, will limit the courts'
ability to deny children constitutional rights... the protective nature of the family
should not insulate the child from receiving the guarantees of the Constitution.").
See Suellyn Scarnecchia, A Child's Right to Protection from Transfer Trauma in a
Contested Adoption Case, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 41, 46 (1995) (arguing that a
child has a "right to due process when state action, in the form of a transfer of cus-
tody, is likely to cause substantial harm to the child").
See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment applies to searches of student property brought to school but, because schools
have a strong interest in maintaining order, searches are conducted under a "rea-
sonable" rather than a "probable cause" suspicion): Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding students' First Amendment right to protest the
United States' involvement in Vietnam in school).
98 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that there exist certain due
process requirements in the adjudication of a child charged with an act that would
constitute a crime if committed by an adult); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (review-
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dren the same constitutional protection as adults except
where such protection would interfere with the responsibili-
ties of school officials or the purposes of the juvenile justice
system.99 "Both the provision of due process rights and their
limitation were based on the needs of children as the Court
saw them."'
III. STATES AND CONTESTED ADOPTION CASES
An examination of how some states have made custody
decisions in contested adoption cases shows why it is neces-
sary to recognize a child's independent constitutional right to
a hearing on her best interests before making a custody de-
termination.
A. Baby Jessica
In the case of "Baby Jessica," a contested adoption case
that made national headlines, the Iowa Supreme Court
awarded custody of two-and-a-half-year-old Jessica, who had
lived almost her entire life with her adoptive parents and had
never even met her biological parents, to her biological par-
ents. "' The court made its decision based on the fact that
her biological father had never formally relinquished his
rights-1
2
When Jessica's biological mother placed her up for adop-
tion, she lied about the identity of Jessica's biological fa-
ther. 3 She and the purported father signed a release of pa-
ing the constitutionality of the Arizona Juvenile Code and delinquency proceedings
under the Code).
99 See Clark. supra note 35. at 8.
100 Id.
'o' See In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992); In re Baby Girl Clausen. 502
N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). qffg In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App.). stay
denied sub nor. DeBoer by Darrow v. DeBoer. 509 U.S. 1301 (1993). stay dented
509 U.S. 938 (1993). After the Iowa supreme courts decision awarding custody of
Jessica to her biological parents, Jessica's adoptive parents. Robby and Jan DeBoer.
who lived in Michigan, attempted to get the Michigan courts to take Jurisdiction un-
der the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) because Jessica had lived
in Michigan for all but three weeks of her life. The DeBoers argued that the courts
should consider the best interests of Jessica before making a decision. The Michigan
court of appeals and the Michigan supreme court concluded that they lacked Juris-
diction under the UCCJA and under the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA) because the custody case was pending In Iowa at the time the petition was
filed in Michigan.
102 See In re B.G.C., 496 N..2d at 246 (stating that the evidence demonstrated
that "Daniel [the father] did everything he could reasonably do to assert his parental
i 3See id. (noting that "the reason for her false information [regarding the identity
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rental rights and the child was placed in the custody of her
adoptive parents soon after her birth.' 4 When Daniel, the
biological father, learned that he was the father of Jessica, he
intervened in the adoption proceedings and asserted his pa-
rental rights. 0 5 What resulted was a tug-of-war between the
biological parents and adoptive parents in which each side
claimed the right to custody of Jessica.
What is most striking about the court's decision is that the
court seemed to recognize that it would be in Jessica's best
interests to remain with her adoptive parents, yet the court
awarded custody to her biological parents.'°6 The court noted
that Daniel "had a poor performance record as a parent" with
his two other children, that he had "largely failed to support
these children financially and... failed to maintain mean-
ingful contact with either of them."0 7 In contrast, the court
stated that Jessica's adoptive parents had provided her with"exemplary care.""°  Unfortunately, the court's decision was
made according to Iowa's adoption statute which states that
the best interest of the child cannot be considered unless the
biological parents consent to adoption or forfeit their right to
withhold consent."°  The court stated: '"While cognizant of
the heartache which this decision will ultimately cause, this
court is presented with no other option than that dictated by
the law in this state."""
of the child's biological father] was that she was dating Scott [the purported father]
at the time she found out that she was pregnant" and did not want to create prob-
lems in her new relationship).
104 See id. at 241 (noting that the mother and purported father signed waivers of
notice of the termination hearing and subsequently, custody of the child was given to
the adopted parents).
105 See id. at 246 (noting that the biological father met with an attorney after
learning he was the baby's father which led to his filing a petition to intervene in the
adoption case of the baby).
See id. at 245 (stating that "It]he argument that the best interests of the baby
are best served by allowing her to stay with R.D. and J.D. [her adoptive parents] Is a
ver7 alluring argument.").
7 Id. at 245.
108 Id. (agreeing with the district court's finding that the adoptive parents "have
provided exemplary care for the child land] view themselves as the parents of this
child in every respect.").
109 See id. (quoting IOWA CODE § 600.3(2)), stating that:
[t]he general rule Is that... 'the court may not consider whether the adoption
will be for the welfare and best interests of the child where the parents have
not consented to an adoption or the conditions which denote the necessity of
their consent do not exist. However, where a parent by his conduct forfeits the
right to withhold consent land)... contests the adoption, the welfare of the
child is the paramount issue.'
In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 245.
11 Id. at 246 (quoting the district court's statements as It awarded custody of the
child to the biological father).
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A constitutional recognition of Jessica's individual consti-
tutional rights would have precluded such an unhappy out-
come. It would bar state courts and legislatures from en-
forcing rules that require blind adherence to the biological-
parental fitness standard. Instead, courts would be com-
pelled to conduct a hearing to explore the effects on the child
of a rupture of her established relationships. In Jessica's
case, testimony established that such a rupture would be
highly detrimental to Jessica, placing her "at an elevated risk
for future difficulties with human interaction, relationships,
and achievement.""'
B. Baby Richard
The courts in Illinois also follow the biological-parental fit-
ness doctrine in situations of contested adoption. This stan-
dard led the court to remove four-year-old "Baby Richard"
from the home of his adoptive parents and place him in the
custody of the biological parents he had never known.
112
Baby Richard's biological parents had ended their rela-
tionship before he was bom, and his biological mother, Dan-
iella, unilaterally decided to place him for adoption."' Rich-
ard's adoptive parents met Daniella while she was living in a
shelter for battered women, and they adopted Richard soon
after his birth.1 4 Apparently, Baby Richard's biological fa-
ther, Otto, was told the baby had died.' 5 When he found out
that Richard was alive, he filed a claim to nullify the adop-
tion. 
1 1 6
The state supreme court reversed the decision of the ap-
pellate court which had ruled in favor of the adoptive parents,
or more accurately, in favor of Richard. The appellate court
had asserted:
To hold that a child is the property of his parents is to deny the
humanity of the child. Thus, in the present case we start with
the premise that Richard is not a piece of property with property
rights belonging to either his biological or adoptive parents.
II Boccaccini & Willemsen. supra note 3. at 221.
12 See In re Kirchner. 649 N.E.2d 324. 334-36 (II. 1995) (stating that. absent vol-
untary relinquishment of the right to care. custody and control of a child, these
rihts belong to the natural parents of the child).
13 See &L. at 326-27 (recounting the facts of the case relating to the circumstances
surrounding the decision to put the child up for adoption).
114 See Ud
"5 See f. at 327.
116 See f&.
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Richard 'belongs' to no one but himself." 7
Unfortunately, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected this
characterization of Richard's rights. It held that Otto, as
Richard's biological father, was entitled to speak for his son's
interests," 8 and it rejected the notion that Richard had indi-
vidual due process rights.1 9 Instead, in an opinion that ac-
cused the adoptive parents of deceit and subterfuge and
which described their relationship with Richard in property
law terms as one of "mere possession," 20 the court found that
Otto had greater rights to custody of his son.121 Most disap-
pointing from Richard's point of view was the court's ruling
that, while "[tihe United States Supreme Court has never de-
cided whether a child has a liberty interest symmetrical with
that of a natural parent in maintaining his current relation-
ship... no such liberty interest exists as regards Richard's
psychological attachment to [his adoptive parents].' 22
The dissenting justice in this case objected to the holding
on the grounds that Richard's due process rights under both
the federal and state constitutions had been violated.' 23  He
rejected the majority's determination that Otto could best
represent his son's interests because Otto's interests were
clearly adverse to his son's.'24
The court's holding was contrary to the protection ac-
corded to individuals by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution."2 The constitutional rights of children as dis-
tinct from their natural parents must be recognized by the
Supreme Court in the context of contested adoption so that
"7 In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 651-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
118 See In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 330 (stating that "Otto, as Richard's natural
father whose rights have not been terminated, has equal if not greater standing to
assert what is in his son's best interests").
19 See id. at 339 (holding that "[while children have a due process liberty interest
in their family life, that interest is not independent of the child's natural parents' in-
terest absent a finding of unfitness").
120 Id. at 335 (stating that since the adoption of Richard was invalidated, the adop-
tive parents only retained "physical possession of Richard but not his custody.").
121 See iL. (stating that because the biological father did not voluntarily place the
child in the care of the adoptive parents, the right of custody was never relinquished
by the biological father).
122 Id. at 339.
123 See id. at 344 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) ("Virtually the entire focus of the ma-
jority opinion relates only to the rights of Kirchner [the biological father], and ignores
the rights of Richard and the Does [his adoptive parents].").
12A See id. (noting that "Kirchner's [the biological father's] interests are adverse to
and in conflict with the child's best interests. Consequently, the general presump-
tion [that the biological father is in the best position to represent his child's best in-
terests] should fail").
125 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... .") (emphasis added).
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their needs and interests are protected.
C. The Rost Twins
Contrary to the Iowa and Illinois courts, courts in Califor-
nia recognize that "children are not merely chattels belonging
to their parents, but rather have fundamental interests of
their own" which "are of constitutional dimension."
The Bridget R case involved twins, Bridget and Lucy Rost,
who were given up for adoption by their biological parents."
The biological parents, who were of Native American descent.
subsequently attempted to invalidate their relinquishment of
parental rights on the grounds that the adoption was not exe-
cuted pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA).'23
While the adoption may have been invalid under the ICWA
(primarily because the biological parents lied about their an-
cestory), the court of appeals reversed the trial court's order
vacating the termination of parental rights.29
The appeals court recognized that, in a contested adop-
tion, "the interests of... the biological family may be in di-
rect conflict with the children's strong needs, which we find
to be constitutionally protected, to remain through their de-
veloping years in one stable and loving home.""' Rather than
finding that the biological parents had a greater "right" to
custody, the court held that:
[Als a matter of simple common sense, the rights of children in
their family relationships are at least as fundamental and com-
pelling as those of their parents. If anything, children's familial
rights are more compelling than adults', because children's in-
terests... also include the... need[]... to have stable and
131permanent homes ....
The court properly held that, while it was preferable to
maintain a child's custodial ties with her biological parents, a
court could not constitutionally make a custody decision in
the situation of contested adoption before conducting a
hearing on the child's behalf to determine her best inter-
126 In re Bridget R.. 41 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1490 (1996). cert. denied. 117 S. Ct.
693 (1997), and cert denied, 117 S. CL 1460 (1997).
127 See id. at 1491 (stating the facts of the case).
128 See id. at 1521-22 (reversing a trial court's order that the children be returned
to their biological parents).
129 See id. at 1490 ('We reverse an order of the trial court made pursuant to sec-
tions 1913 and 1918 of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978.).
136 Id. at 1502 ("An Individual's many related Interests In matters of family life are
compelling and are ranked among the most basic of civil rights.").
131 Id. at 1504 (stating that stability In the home Is necessary for healthy develop-
ment in childhood).
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The Bridget R. opinion should serve as a model for other
courts in contested adoption cases. The court did not allow
statutory procedures to violate a child's constitutional
rights.' 3 Nor did it fail to recognize that biological parents
have constitutional rights which prospective adoptive parents
do not necessarily possess."
IV. THE UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT
A legislative effort that better addresses the rights of chil-
dren in the context of contested adoption is the Uniform
Adoption Act ("UAA").' m The National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") 136 approved the
text of the UAA in 1994.137 The NCCUSL recognized that state
adoption laws are inconsistent and confusing, and fashioned
the UAA as "a comprehensive and uniform state adoption
code that ... promotes the interest of minor children in being
raised by individuals who are committed to, and capable of,
caring for them.""
The UAA is written to protect children's interests and with
an eye toward avoiding contested adoptions. Before finalizing
an adoption, the court must determine whether an unknown
father can be identified and located for the purpose of notify-
ing him of the adoption proceeding. 39 Biological parents may
only consent to adoption after their child is born and may re-
voke consent within 192 hours after the child's birth.4 0 If the
132 See id. at 1517 ("[We believe It would constitute a violation of the due process
clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to remove a child from a stable
placement... without a hearing to determine whether the child would suffer harm if
removed from that placement.").
13 The court did remand the case for trial on Issues raised by the ICWA- namely
to determine whether there was evidence that the twins were part of an existing In-
dian family so as to justify the application of the ICWA. See ci. at 1521-22. The
case was settled before trial. See discussion Infra Part VII.
134 See id. at 1506 (noting that parental rights are generally accorded deference
under the Constitution).
135 See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (amended 1994), 9 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1999).136 The NCCUSL is a nonprofit organization comprised of judges, lawyers, law pro-
fessors, and state legislators. NCCUSL members are "appointed by the governors of
every state to draft proposed legislation on a broad range of topics." See Joan Helfetz
HoUinger, Adoption and Aspiration: The Uniform Adoption Act, The DeBoer-Schmldt
Case, and the American Quest for the Ideal Family, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 15,
40 n.4 (1995).
137 See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT, Historical Notes at 1.
138 Id., Prefatory Note, at 2 (stating the goals of the UAA).
139 See (i. at § 3-404 (providing for investigation and notice to unknown father).
140 See id. at § 2-404(a) (stating time and prerequisites for execution of consent or
relinquishment).
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biological parent revokes consent within 192 hours, the pro-
spective adoptive parent must immediately return the child to
the custody of the person revoking consent.'4 ' If the prospec-
tive adoptive parent does not return the child, the person re-
voking consent may petition the court for relief and the court
must hear the petition "expeditiously."'
42
The UAA further safeguards against custody fights by re-
quiring that the biological parent[s] be informed of the conse-
quences of adoption and be offered personal and legal coun-
seling before executing a consent to adoption. 3 Persons who
explain and witness the consent to adoption "must be knowl-
edgeable about adoption and not have a conflict of interest
with the parent or guardian."'" For example, the witness
cannot be a lawyer representing an adoptive parent."'
As a general rule, both biological parents of a minor child
must consent to the adoption of their child. 4 ' In some situa-
tions where a man who may be the child's father has not
manifested "parenting behavior," however, the UAA does not
require the father's consent. 47 The UAA recognizes that "an
individual's biological ties to a child are not alone sufficient to
bestow full parental rights on that individual."' 48 The consent
provisions of the UAA are "[in accord with federal and state
constitutional decisions since the early 1970s on the status of
unwed fathers in adoption proceedings."'
49
Should a contested adoption arise, the UAA contains com-
prehensive procedures to resolve the custody dispute. ' so The
UAA requires an expedited hearing'5' and the appointment of
a guardian ad litem for minor children.'" The requirement of
a guardian ad litem "is intended to encourage the court and
the contestants to pay attention to the needs of the minor, in-
141 See id. at § 2-408 (stating standards and requirements for revocation of con-
sent).
142 See id.
143 See id. at § 2-404(e) (discussing prerequisites for executing a consent or relin-
quishment).
144 Id. at § 2-405 cmt. at 34 (establishing a procedure for execution of consent or
relinquishment).
145 See id. at § 2-405(a)(4) (stating that a consent or relinquishment must be exe-
cuted in the presence of "a lawyer other than a lawyer who is representing an adop-
tive parent or the agency to which a minor is relinquished").
14 See Ud. at § 2-401 (identifying persons whose consent is required).
147 IdL at § 2-401 cmt at 28.
148 Id., Prefatory Note, at 3.
149 Id. at § 2-401 cmL at 28.
150 See iU. Prefatory Note, at 4.
151 See id.
152 Id. at § 3-201.
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cluding the need for expeditious resolution of the dispute.""
During a contested adoption proceeding, courts must make
an interim custody order "according to the best interest of the
minor."' 54 This is to protect the child from "detrimental dis-
ruptions of [a] stable custodial environment]." 55
Most importantly, the UAA recognizes that children do not
"belong" to a biological or adoptive parent. In accordance
with attachment theory, the UAA "is premised on the belief
that children's ties to the individuals who actually parent
them- or who are committed to parenting them- deserve le-
gal protection even if those ties are psychologically and so-
cially constructed and not biologically rooted."'" For exam-
ple, even if there is some fault with the adoption procedure,
after the 192 hour period for revoking consent expires, the
child is not automatically returned to the custody of her birth
parent:
The fact that a birth parent's status as a legal parent may be re-
stored or recognized upon the setting aside of a consent or a re-
linquishment is not tantamount to a determination that the mi-
nor must be placed in that parent's custody .... [Tihis Act
requires the court to make an independent determination with
respect to the minor's custody. That determination ultimately
depends on what the court decides is not detrimental to the mi-
nor... or is in the minor's best interests. 157
The UAA is a statutory attempt to recognize that children's
rights to a secure upbringing should be constitutionally pro-
tected. Unfortunately, while the UAA is written to ensure
that a child who cannot be raised by her biological parents is
placed in a secure, nurturing home, and contains procedural
safeguards to avoid custody disputes that may be psychologi-
cally detrimental to the child, Vermont is the only state that
has enacted the UAA.' The widespread failure of the states
to enact this carefully-written and comprehensive adoption
statute provides a compelling reason for the Supreme Court
to explicitly recognize that children possess individual con-
stitutional rights in the context of contested adoption. States
are not taking the initiative to protect children's rights, and
5 Id. at § 3-201 cmt. at 42 (requiring appointment of a lawyer or guardian ad li-
ten).
1 Id. at § 3-204 (requiring interim custody determination during pendency of pro-
ceeding).
155 Ic., Prefatory Note, at 4.
5 Hollinger, supra note 136, at 17.
157 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-408 cmt. at 38 (amended 1994). 9 U.L.A. 1 (Supp.
1999).
158 Id., Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted at 1.
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as discussed, supra, the state in which a child happens to re-
side should not limit the child's basic liberty rights.
V. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
CHILD
In 1989, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 9 The main rationale
for drafting a separate human rights treaty for children was
that children "need[] special safeguards and care, including
appropriate legal protection.""6  While respecting parental
rights, the Convention, similar to the UAA, declares that [in
all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by pub-
lic or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, ad-
ministrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests
of the child shall be a primary consideration."6' Unlike most
of the states in this country, the Convention recognizes that
children have rights, including rights to the family relation-
ship, that are independent of parental rights.
Not surprisingly, the United States has yet to ratify the
Convention.'1 Some commentators believe that opposition to
the Convention comes from adherence to the "property the-
ory" of parenthood, that critics of the treaty believe that rec-
ognition of children's rights as individuals would undermine
parents' rights to raise their children in the manner they see
fit." The Convention, however, is a human rights treaty; the
requirement that the best interests of the child be considered
"is not meant to undermine parental authority, but to place
limits on governmental authority to violate the human rights
of children."' ' Since the rights of parents recognized by the
Supreme Court are not rights of ownership, the Convention
does not contradict the United States Constitution.'6 The
Convention, like the UAA, should serve as a model for recog-
nizing the individual interests of children. Rather than weak-
15 GA Res. 25XLIV), U.N. GAOR. 44th Sess.. Supp. No. 49. U.N. Doe. A/44125
(1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).
160 Id. at Preamble.
161 Id. at Art. 3, para. 1 (emphasis added).
1 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights. 5 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POvERTY 313. 313 (1998) (not-
ing consistent opposition to the Convention on the Rights of the Child by the United
States).
1 See id. at 313-14 (outlining the history of the "property theory' of parenthood].
16 Id. at 318.
16 See id. at 319 ([If the constitutional rights of parents are grounded in the
rights of their children," not in the "rights of ownership." then "endoring a child with
'rights' of her own" will not "contradict the basic constitutional scheme.1.
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ening parents' rights, recognizing children's rights separate
from those of their parents would strengthen the family unit
because both parents and children would have individually-
protected liberty interests.
VI. ENSURING PROTECTION OF A CHILD'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND WELFARE
Once it is recognized that children have constitutional
rights separate from those of their parents in the context of
contested adoption, then the protection of children's needs
and interests can be ensured. The Court's recognition of par-
ents' constitutional right to raise their children should not
obscure the fact that children have separate rights from those
of their parents. The Court's acknowledgement of parental
rights is grounded in the recognition of the fundamental right
to family life.'6 As discussed previously, the Supreme Court
has stated that families are not only defined on biological
grounds." Furthermore, as the history behind the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment has indicated, both children
and parents have constitutionally-protected rights of family
autonomy."
In addition to recognizing a child's constitutional right to a
hearing on her best interests when her adoption is being
contested, adoption laws need to be clarified and changed to
ensure that the child's best interests are being considered.
The UAA is an excellent model that balances the rights of
children with the rights of those adults who are committed to
raising them.
In the situation of a contested adoption, a guardian ad li-
1 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 260 (1983) ("Parental rights do not
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They re-
quire relationships more enduring.") (emphasis in Lehr omitted) (quoting Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (reaffirming that "freedom of personal choice in matters
of... family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.") (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632.
639-40 (1974)); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) ("ITIhe parental
right to guide one's child intellectually and religiously Is a most substantial part of
the liberty and freedom of the parent."); Meyer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to marry, establish a
home, and bring up children).
167 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977) dis-
cussed supra Part III.D. ("[B]iological relationships are not exclusive determination of
the existence of a family.").
1 See DAVIS, supra note 42, at 242 (suggesting that "parental autonomy provides
a context within which children learn to function as free and self-defining democratic
citizens").
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tem should always be appointed to investigate the child's
situation and make recommendations as to her best inter-
ests. In addition, the child should be appointed her own at-
torney to protect her interests.'6 This would be consistent
with the requirements of the UAA. '7°
In determining the child's "best interests," the courts
should look to the attachment theory for guidance on the im-
pact of removing the child from her adoptive home.'71 Other
factors to be considered are the child's age,'" emotional at-
tachment to siblings and their placement, and racial or cul-
tural factors. 73 The changing interests of children as they
mature should also be considered. 4  Psychologists and ex-
perts in child development should always be consulted in
making the "best interests" determination. The wealth or
education of the parties should never come into the analysis
because the best interests of the child are to be determined
from a child-centered perspective. '
Those against recognizing a child's constitutional rights in
the context of contested adoption fear that it will encourage
prospective adoptive parents to unscrupulously gain physical
possession of a child and forge an attachment, thereby gain-
ing permanent custody of the child as a result of a subse-
quent best interests analysis. 76 However, this problem can
'69 See Tenenbaum, supra note 5. at 6 (asserting that parents who abuse and ne-
glect their children are entitled to counsel and this same right should be afforded to
children subject to the same experiences).
170 UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 3-201 (amended 1994). 9 U.LA. 42 (Supp. 1999).
171 See Kaplan, supra note 19. at 932-36.
172 See discussion supra Part II.C.
17 See Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoptiorn Implications For
Collaborative Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997. 1054 (1995) (arguing
that racial and cultural "continuity" is in a child's best interests and that. as trans-
racial and transcultural adoptions become more commonplace. 'the child's need for
ties to his or her heritage should be a factor in determining whether the child will be
served by maintaining postadoption familial contact" (with a birth family that places
a child for adoption but wishes to retain some contact with the child)).
174 See Annette R. Appell & Bruce A. Boyer, Parental Rights vs. Best Interests of the
Child- A False Dichotomy in the Context of Adoption, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L & POL'" 63.
80-81 (1995) (discussing the failure of the best interest standard to provide for a
child's changing interests).
175 See Woodhouse. supra note 8. at 2504-05 (arguing that a child-centered
evaluation of children's needs would give greater weight to the child's attachment to
his or her parents than is provided by current law. Unlike the best interest stan-
dard, which defines "interests" from an adult-centric perspective. a child-centered
perspective values relationships of attachment because they are so important to
children).
176 See Lewis, supra note 12, at 260 (discussing In re C.C.RS., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo.
1995), in which a couple attempted to bypass the legal obstacles to adoption. and
the court reasoned that regardless of whether the couple could lawfully adopt the
boy, the child's best interests "required placement with the couple because they had
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be prevented by giving custody cases priority in the court
system and awarding them an expedited hearing. It is not
psychologically and developmentally harmful for a child to be
placed in a new setting if she has been in a person's care for
only a few months.'" In addition, it may not be in a child's
best interests, especially as she matures and begins to ask
questions about her upbringing, to award custody to people
who have engaged in criminal and/or truly deceitful behavior.
It also needs to be recognized that a child's best interests
do not necessarily lie in a choice between one family or an-
other.'78 This is especially true since "[a]dopted children are
forever members of two families- the one that gave them life
and the one that nurtured them through the process of
adoption."179 Rather than an all-or-nothing approach, courts
should consider more flexible remedies such as open adop-
tion'" and foster care.1
81
Flexible remedies have worked in the situation of con-
tested adoption. In fact, in one recent case, mediation by a
family therapist led to a resolution that was satisfactory to all
the adults involved and truly in the interest of "Baby Pete":
his adoptive mother retained custody and his biological father
retained legal status as his father. 8 In the Rost twins' case,
discussed supra, the adoptive parents and biological parents
agreed on an arrangement whereby the girls would remain in
the custody of their adoptive parents but would have visits
with their biological parents and, as they get older, spend va-
cations on the reservation where their biological grandmother
retained physical possession of the boy throughout his life").
177 See Kaplan, supra note 19, at 935-36 ([Wihen no one person has cared for an
infant for more than a few months, the child should not yet have developed a de-
pendency on any one person at the time of placement. Thus, placing the Infant in a
new setting should not have an adverse impact on him.") (quoting In re Doe, 627
N.E.2d 648, 664 n. 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (Tully, P.J., dissenting)).
178 See Woodhouse, supra note 8, at 2509 n.45 (suggesting that more flexible
remedies such as open adoption should be considered rather than relying on the all-
or-nothing approach of absolute and exclusive rights); see also Suellyn Scarnecchia,
Who Is Jessica's Mother? Defining Motherhood Through Reality, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER &
L. 1, 12 (1994) ("We must push our clients, the parents, to talk with each other, to
acknowledge that the child needs all of them, and that compromise Is almost always
in the child's best interests.").
179 See Appell, supra note 173, at 997 (quoting Kenneth W. Watson, The Case for
Open Adoption, PUB. WELFARE, Fall 1998, at 24, 24).
ISO Id. at 1001 ("Open adoption is a flexible concept encompassing a spectrum of
relationships that range from the exchange of information among the [adoptive and
birth] parents to ongoing participation of the birth family in the life of the adoptive
family.").
181 See Woodhouse, supra note 8, at 2509 (stating that foster care often evolves
into a desire to adopt because of the power of attachment).
182 See Hales, supra note 4, at 20.
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resides in order to remain connected with their Native Ameri-
can heritage."8
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions regarding the constitution-
ality of various state adoption statutes have not provided the
states with the clear direction they need to safely and validly
protect children's interests.' 8 Prior Court decisions, however,
would seem to indicate that children possess constitutional
rights separate from those of their biological parents in the
situation of a contested adoption.
As previously discussed, it is settled law that the Four-
teenth Amendment protects the family relationship. What
needs to be recognized is that, "[firom the child's perspective,
his relationship with his adoptive family is no different from
the most traditional family relationships protected in the past
from state interference by [the Supreme] Court-" _'
A child should not be removed from a stable, secure home
and from caregivers to whom she is attached without due
process of law. Removing her from her home without a
hearing on her best interests is a violation of her constitu-
tional rights to personal liberty and family liberty. In order to
ensure that children's interests are safeguarded, it needs to
be recognized that children have a right, as persons under
the Constitution, to a custody hearing in which their true
best interests are considered.
183 Interview with Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. Professor of Law. University of
Pennsylvania Law School. in Philadelphia. Pa. (OcL 27. 1998).
184 See Clark, supru note 35. at 39 (discussing that it is unfortunate that the
courts' treatment of the statutes' constitutional validity leaves the states uncertain
as to how to safely protect children's interests in adoption).
185 Scamecchia, supra note 96. at 56.
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